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Jussi Suikkanen and Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral 
Philosophy, Routledge, 2019, 242pp., $140.00, ISBN 9781138322097. 
David Faraci, Durham University 
 
Methodology and Moral Philosophy is fairly typical for edited volumes in 
contemporary analytic philosophy. The editors choose a topic. Most authors write 
essays that are clearly relevant to that topic, but also illuminate its breadth, 
together composing something not quite cohesive. Most of the essays are good 
(there is no obvious correlation between relevance and quality) and perhaps more 
importantly some are refreshing as the authors have allowed themselves room for 
the kind of innovative exploration that the cutthroat world of journal publishing 
tends to discourage.  
Given this, if someone tells me they are interested in methodology and 
moral philosophy, I probably won’t recommend that they run out and buy this 
book. But this somewhat negative point is not what I want to focus on; I mention 
it only because this is after all meant to be a review of the book. I’d rather focus 
on two things: first, that if someone tells me they are interested in any of a number 
of questions in ethics or metaethics, I will definitely point them towards particular 
chapters; and second, that I am glad books like this continue to be published, 
because whether or not they work well as books, they winnow a lot of wheat that 
our field’s publishing practices too frequently mistake for chaff. 
The volume is split into four parts—to their credit, the editors do not try 
to shoehorn the chapters into a single narrative. The first part, “The Prospects of 
Empirical Ethics,” is quite different from the others. As the title suggests, its three 
chapters concern the role that empirical data can or should play in ethics. In 
Chapter 2, “How to Debunk Moral Beliefs,” Victor Kumar and Joshua May argue 
that global epistemological debunking arguments in ethics fail, but that non-
global ones represent an important space in ethics for empirical work. They 
introduce a dilemma for global debunking arguments: debunkers either (a) 
identify an epistemically defective contributor to moral belief-formation, but fail 
to demonstrate that it is a major contributor (the “empirical flaw”); or (b) identify 
a major contributor to moral belief-formation, but fail to demonstrate that it is 
epistemically defective (the “normative flaw”). I find their suggestion that there is 
tension between these two elements of debunking arguments interesting, but 
their motivation of the “normative flaw” horn focuses on issues that are simply 
too large, contentious and difficult for the space afforded them. One cannot 
reasonably expect to resolve the ongoing debate over the potential gap between 
the moral truth and our evolved moral attitudes in a single paragraph. 
In Chapter 3, “Who’s Afraid of Trolleys?” Antti Kauppinen (one of the 
editors; the other wrote the introduction) defends traditional thought-
experiment-based ethical methodology against recent empirical challenges. 
Kauppinen offers an in my view much-needed critique: experiments tend to be 
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run in contexts markedly different from those in which these methodologies are 
actually employed. As he puts it, “it would be a mistake to think that philosophical 
training fosters a skill in thought experimentation that can be exercised in 
isolation from the context of a philosophical debate” (69). Hear, hear. 
In Chapter 4, “Learnability and Moral Nativism: Exploring Wilde Rules,” 
Tyler Millhouse, Alisabeth Ayars and Shaun Nichols offer empirical evidence that 
people are capable of learning “Wilde rules,” which prohibit allowing something 
but permit deliberate causation of it—so named for Oscar Wilde’s bon mot that a 
“gentleman never offends unintentionally.” This serves to undermine the nativist 
hypothesis that certain uncommon norm structures are unlearnable—analogous 
to the idea that the unlearnability of certain grammatical structures supports 
linguistic nativism. The chapter showcases empirical methodology more than 
discussing it, so it’s a bit of a stretch where relevance is concerned, but again I 
saw no correlation between relevance and quality; it’s fascinating work. 
The volume’s second part, “New Methods,” comprises two chapters. 
Chapter 5 is Catherine Wilson’s “Metaethics from a First-Person Standpoint,” in 
which she “describe[s] an approach to the question of the sources of normativity 
that developed from my own frustrations in teaching metaethics from a third-
person standpoint, that is, in the normal way, to undergraduates and graduates” 
(94). Her narrative may well be pedagogically useful—the content is drawn from 
her open-source textbook—but as someone who works in metaethics, I did not 
find it especially illuminating. 
Chapter 6 is Andrew Sepielli’s “Consequentialism and Action qua Action.” 
This is one of the chapters that makes me particularly glad this sort of volume 
exists. And I say that despite disagreeing with him strongly.  
Sepielli offers a defense of consequentialism on structural, axiological 
grounds. This doesn’t represent a new method per se; lots of consequentialists 
have tried to show that alternatives face structural problems—consider the 
“paradox of deontology.” But close enough. The basic idea is that authoritative 
norms are all things considered norms, and that being all things considered means 
evaluating things full stop, rather than with respect to some limited category. 
Consequentialism, Sepielli claims, considers whether an action is good; other 
views ask only whether it is a good action. 
This is clever and fascinating. But I don’t think it works. Sepielli thinks 
that pure evaluation of an action evaluates it as “a kind of thing or event” where 
“what makes a thing good are the past, present and future consequences of its 
existing, occurring or obtaining” (115). In short, the suggestion seems to be that 
the kind of evaluation we apply to states of affairs is a sort of default. I see why 
this would be attractive to many people in a long line of consequentialist-heavy 
normative ethics. I also see it as precisely the sort of claim non-consequentialists 
have been at great pains to reveal as a substantive commitment, rather than an 
implication of axiological structures defensible on ethical-theory-neutral 
grounds. (I raise similar concerns about the “paradox of deontology” in my (2019).) 
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But this doesn’t mean the work isn’t important; for one, it helps me (and hopefully 
others) to better understand where sophistical consequentialists and I disagree. 
The latter two parts of the volume are “Evaluations of Recent Methods” 
and “Normative Ethics and Metaethics.” I want to discuss three of the remaining 
five chapters together, so from here I step a bit out of order. 
Part 3 opens with Chapter 7, Christopher Cowie’s “The Similarity 
Hypothesis in Metaethics.” It is (as is typical for Cowie) a carefully thorough 
critique of a common, but often underspecified claim: that theoretical and 
practical normativity are sufficiently similar that we should expect their 
metasemantics, metaphysics and epistemology to parallel one another. If you’re 
interested in that claim—and a lot of people are—I’d give it a read. 
Part 4 opens with Chapter 10, Pekka Väyrynen’s “Normative 
Commitments in Metanormative Theory.” Väyrynen offers a recipe for 
demonstrating that a metaethical view has substantive normative ethical 
implications. He then applies this recipe to argue that some particular metaethical 
views unexpectedly have such implications—metaphysical views about the modal 
status of normative principles; and metasemantic views about what fixes the 
extension of normative predicates. I suspect he’s right, though I am less sanguine 
than he is that having such implications doesn’t threaten the credibility of the 
views in question. For reasons of space I won’t say more about why, except to 
note that my concerns are related to issues of “non-arbitrariness” discussed below. 
Whatever the significance of Väyrynen’s results, it’s very cool stuff. 
The remaining contributions are Part 3, Chapters 8 and 9—James 
Lenman’s “The That” and Jack Woods’ “Footing the Cost (of Normative 
Subjectivism)”—and Part 4, Chapter 11—Matthew Silverstein’s “Revisionist 
Metaethics.” Each speaks in favor of metaethical anti-realism (broadly construed), 
but in very different ways: Lenman argues for a socially and historically cognizant 
Humeanism about reasons; Woods argues that subjectivism is compatible with 
the kind of “universality” required by normativity’s functional role; Silverstein 
suggests that there is tension between the intensional and extensional adequacy of 
metaethical theories, and argues that we should give priority to the former—
something he takes to favor anti-realism.  
As an anti-Humean, anti-subjectivist realist, I was unconvinced by all 
three chapters. But there was a marked contrast between my reactions to 
Lenman’s versus the other two. Lenman’s seemed to me an exemplar of an all-
too-common, frustrating pattern: a philosopher notes some important features of 
a phenomenon and suggests that those features support their favored view, 
without engaging at all with the many philosophers with opposing views who 
explicitly recognize those very same features. For example, consider the point—
made by many in many different ways—that deliberation in accordance with some 
sort of normative standard seems inescapable. One incarnation that’s received a 
good deal of recent attention is Bart Streumer’s work defending a literally 
unbelievable error theory (e.g., his 2017). Given this, I found Lenman’s claim that 
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such inescapability is “intended to embarrass the error theorist, as indeed it 
should” as ironic as I did needlessly acerbic (149).  
Woods and Silverstein, by contrast—much like Sepielli—left me with a 
bolstered understanding and appreciation of my opponents and our 
disagreements. And I’ll note once again that I found these chapters illuminating 
in ways that remind me of the particular value of this sort of volume. 
Woods thinks that common claims that normativity’s function requires a 
kind of non-arbitrariness should be understood “as claiming that the functional 
role of normative theorising requires that we be able to criticise and correct the 
actions of others” (175). Setting aside whether he is right that subjectivism can 
accommodate interpersonal criticism and correction, I think we should be at least 
as concerned with intrapersonal (and intrasocietal) non-arbitrariness. I am just as 
interested in criticizing and correcting myself and us writ large as I am in 
criticizing and correcting others in accordance with norms I endorse. I have 
difficulty seeing how Woods’ sense of universality could accommodate that. 
This brings me finally to Silverstein. Ideally, a metaethical view would 
vindicate or explain away our intuitions about the nature of ethics—e.g., the non-
arbitrariness constraint just discussed—as well as about the content of ethics—e.g., 
that killing innocents for fun is wrong. Silverstein argues that given the inchoate 
nature of secular ethical inquiry, where there is tension between such intensional 
and extensional theoretical adequacy, we should privilege the former.  
I’m sympathetic. But I was surprised that Silverstein places ethics’ 
purported universality in the extensional camp. Universality obviously has 
extensional implications, but I view it as an implication of the intuitions about 
non-arbitrariness just discussed. I’ll close with a few words about this, following 
on the heels of Silverstein’s claim that intuitions about universality have their 
roots in religious ethics: 
[O]ur shared sense of moral principles as governing everyone 
regardless of their attitudes evolved from a religious context in 
which divine commands take precisely that form. In the 
Abrahamic religions, at least, God’s laws are generally universal 
in scope: ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is supposed to govern everyone, not 
merely those whose desires would be subserved by refraining 
from killing. (221-2) 
I am no religious scholar, but this at least doesn’t strike me as obviously 
correct. The particular command mentioned notwithstanding, the majority of 
Jewish laws—Judaism, of course, being the OG of Abrahamic religions—are not 
universalistic. They are explicitly the Abrahamic god’s laws for the Jewish people. 
Indeed, at least early forms of Judaism were meant to be consistent with other 
peoples’ having different laws from their own gods.  
What religious ethics does have is a different kind of universality of 
enforcement. It seems likely that the loss of divine enforcement explains early 
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secular ethical obsession with the “why be moral” challenge. But that challenge is 
independent of the kind of universality of application Silverstein is talking about—
relativists can wonder why they should be moral at least as easily as anyone else.  
Rather than being a feature of religious ethics that has persisted past its 
time, I see the demand for universality of application as rooted in concerns that 
span the divide between the religious and the secular. One of our oldest bits of 
metaethics is the worry that divine commands might be too arbitrary to explain 
morality’s authoritativeness—not the authority of external enforcement 
(obviously the divine can provide that) but the authority of internal allegiance; 
not “what keeps me from defying God?”, but “why should I take God’s command 
as what’s to be done?” What our distance from religious ethics has done, I think, 
is sharpen our focus. I suspect this partly explains flagging interest in the “why 
be moral” challenge. I think it also helps explain increased attention to 
“substantive” or “authoritative” normativity, rather than morality. 
It seems to me that in secular metaethics, this same concern generates 
resistance to views that ground ethics in features of individuals or social 
structures. Perhaps there can be non-arbitrariness and authoritativeness without 
universality of application. But I, for one, find it difficult to see how, at the 
fundamental level, something could non-arbitrarily command my allegiance, but 
not yours. And this, of course, is just my worry about Woods again. 
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